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In recent years, the judicial role in public policy has greatly ex-
panded: courts have been actively involved in the administration of
penal, welfare, education, mental health, and environmental protec-
tion policies.' In remedying perceived wrongs, they have had to in-
teract with the public bureaucracies operating in the particular policy
arenas affected. Judges have not sought merely to monitor the activities
of these institutions but have attempted to restructure them, to change
their processes and policies.
Numerous commentators have discussed whether courts are well-
equipped to intervene in matters of policy and administration.2 After
briefly reviewing that debate, this Note argues that its focus has
largely been misdirected. The principal concern should not be with
determining whether courts can make use of apparatuses to assist in
the decisionmaking process, but with preparing judges for the task
of restructuring bureaucracies. If a remedy is to be effective, then
a judge designing relief must take into account the nature of the
organizations whose policies and processes he seeks to alter. A court
must appreciate the limits of institutional capacity as well as the op-
portunities for change. Only if it does so can the judiciary act creatively
to rectify injustice and to preserve the exercise of rights. The Note
contends that organization theory can provide an instructive frame-
1. See, e.g., Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972) (municipal services); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (prisons); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in Part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mental health).
2. Compare Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1308 (1976) (courts may have institutional advantages in restructuring institu-
tions) and Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 783, 821-42 (1978) (examining administrative techniques that courts can
use) with D. HoRownz, THE CouRTs AND SOCIAL POLICY 33-56 (1977) (discussing limits of
judicial process) and Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services? 50 PUB. INTEREST
64 (1978) (arguing courts ill-suited to tasks of social intervention).
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work that will aid a judge in initially predicting the administrative
feasibility of a proposed remedy, in fashioning workable relief, and
then in implementing the chosen plan. After presenting the framework,
the Note demonstrates its utility by applying it to Hart v. Community
School Board,3 a case in which a court redesigned an educational in-
stitution to achieve integration.
I. The Capacity of Courts to Intervene
To fashion effective changes in policy and administration, decision-
makers must be able to collect information, assess various alternatives,
monitor the implementation process, and secure the compliance of the
targeted bureaucracies.4  Commentators have vigorously debated
whether judges have the capacity to perform such tasks.3 According to
many observers, the judiciary is ill-equipped to intervene in matters of
policy and administration, even when important rights are being
violated. These commentators allege that courts are incapable of col-
lecting and interpreting the data needed to determine whether and
how to alter the programs and processes of public bureaucracies0 be-
3. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.) (liability decision and subsequent order selecting special
master), supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (remedial order), aff'd, 512 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1975).
4. See Y. DROR, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED 163-96 (1968) (all models of public
administration and public policy make provision for data gathering, policy assessment,
and monitoring).
5. Compare Chayes, supra note 2 (favorably assessing courts' capacity to intervene)
and Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1979) (same) with A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 81-
181 (1970) (questioning capacity of courts to remake social policy) and L. GRAGLIA,
DISASTER BY DECREE (1976) (examining problems of court-ordered school desegregation).
Some commentators are ambivalent about judicial capacity. See Cox, The New Dimen-
sions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REv. 791 (1976) (viewing court inter-
vention as necessary, but doubting whether judicial procedures and personnel are suited
to tasks of institutional reform).
6. See D. HOROwITz, supra note 2, at 48 (adversary method could stifle introduction
of relevant information if litigants skillfully use rules of evidence); P. ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 202 (1972) (same). See generally Hazard, Limitations
on the Uses of Behavioral Science in the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 71 (1967) (problems
preventing effective application of social science).
It is also charged that judges may not have the expertise to evaluate information that
is admitted. See, e.g., Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of Social
Science Evidence, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. (No. 2) 217, 240 (1975); Moynihan, Social
Science and the Courts, 54 PUB. INTEREST 12, 15 (1979).
One observer contends that the judiciary errs in relying too heavily on "theoretical"
knowledge offered by academic experts, rather than on information supplied by practi-
tioners who may be in a better position to know of the limitations of the state of social
science. See Glazer, supra note 2, at 78-79.
Finally, critics argue that because the courts' information is filtered through the
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cause adjudicatory decisionmaking is piecemeal and reactive.7
Critics of judicial intervention further maintain that because ad-
judication is concerned with legal relationships-rights and obliga-
tions-judges generally overlook the feasibility of remedies" and thus
do not try to ascertain how decisions will affect, or be affected by, the
broader social and political milieu. 9 They also charge that even if a
judge wants to be attentive to remedial issues, he lacks the machinery
to uncover unintended consequences and to correct errors.'0 Finally,
commentators have stated that courts make decisions that are better
left to elected officials, whose actions reflect the value preferences of
their constituents.'- Courts are imperial in imposing their uninformed
prisms of self-interested parties, judges may not have access to all relevant data. See B.
MfOORE, REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY 95-96 (1972) (defense lawyer will not
admit that new evidence offered by prosecution is valid if it hurts client); Wolf, Social
Science and the Courts: The Detroit Schools Case, 42 PUB. INTEREST 102, 111 (1976) (parties
were less than candid in presenting all relevant information).
7. See, e.g., J. GRAY, THE NAmRE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 114-15 (1921) (judges
"determine duties and corresponding rights upon the application of persons claiming
those rights') (emphasis in original); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITTrrON AND THE
WARREN COURT 196 (1970) (judges unable to initiate and conduct own inquiries).
8. See D. HoRowrrz, supra note 2, at 34 (questions of feasibility are thought minor or
unimportant); Glazer, supra note 2, at 74 (same).
9. D. HoRowrrz, supra note 2, at 35; cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 175 (1970) (judicial
process "too remote from conditions, and deals, case by case, with too narrow a slice of
reality" and thus "it is, in a vast, complex, changeable society, a most unsuitable instru-
ment for the formation of policy"); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 395-96 (1978) (courts ill-equipped to resolve "polycentric" problems).
Unlike legislators and administrators, judges, the argument proceeds, are not conscious
of the budgetary constraints that affect policy choices. They make decisions without the
administrator's or legislator's concern for the trade-offs among many programs that have
to be made when resources are limited. See Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126
U. PA. L. REv. 715, 788 (1978); Thomas, Have the Judges Done Too Much? Time, Jan.
22, 1979, at 91 (quoting Professor Paul Freund as stating: "Courts . . . see problems
through a keyhole. What they ordain in the way of expenditures is not correlated with
expenditures for other needs.")
10. D. HoROwiTz, supra note 2, at 53; Wells & Grossman, The Concept of Judicial
Policy-Making: A Critique, 15 J. PUB. L. 286, 305 (1966).
If the parties do not inform the courts of implementation problems, perhaps owing to
a lack of resources, then the courts may never attend to those difficulties. See Howard,
Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation on Separation
of Powers, 18 J. PUB. L. 339, 367-68 (1969). Conceivably, write some observers, suits or
follow-up actions might arise after so much damage has been done that an effective
remedy cannot be fashioned. D. HOROwiTz, supra note 2, at 39; Wells & Grossman, supra,
at 303.
11. See Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INTERST 104, 118, 122 (1975);
cf. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103 (1976)
("excessive reliance upon courts instead of self-government through democratic processes
may deaden a people's sense of moral and political responsibility for their own future");
Frug, supra note 9, at 742 (shift of power away from elected officials weakens democratic
accountability); Nagel, Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 718-23 (1978)
(judicial assumption of legislative and executive tasks violates separation of powers
doctrine).
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views on bureaucracies; 12 therefore their remedies may be met with
intransigence.
13
Such criticisms are, for the most part, oversimplified; courts are not
necessarily ill-equipped to intervene in matters of policy and ad-
ministration.1 4 The judiciary does not have to be passive or suffer from
information insularity. To facilitate the gathering of data and the
weighing of remedial options, judges have made use of hearings's at
which they have been exposed to differing views from theorists as well
as practitioners.16 They can also undertake off-the-bench research,
17
appoint special masters,' 8 expert witnesses, and consultants,' 9 and make
use of amicus briefs.20 Judges can be made aware of the uses
2' and
12. Glazer, supra note 11, at 104-24. Relatedly, critics of judicial intervention claim
that by reducing the power and responsibility of administrators, courts decrease the
discretion of those bureaucrats who are most familiar with the existing situation. See
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (assumes bureaucracy has superior knowledge
of its own affairs and thus should not be limited by courts in dispatch of own internal
affairs).
Moreover, it is alleged that such court action undermines-the authority of bureaucrats
because it reinforces the public's and recipients' lack of confidence in the administrator.
Glazer, supra note 2, at 76. Consequently, the morale of the bureaucrats is likely to
suffer. See Bershad, The Law and Corrections: A Management Perspective, 4 NEw ENG. J.
PRIsoN L. 49, 60-61 (1977) (stating that correctional reform cases have demoralized correc-
tion officials).
13. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977) (opposition from faculty and administration to court's desegregation
decrees).
14. For views of judges advocating an active role, see Frankel, The Adversary Judge,
54 TEx. L. REv. 465 (1976); Johnson, Observation: The Constitution and the Federal
District Judge, 54 TEx. L. Rav. 903 (1976).
15. See Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), supplemented,
383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); FED. R. EvID. 614
(court's power to call and examine witnesses).
16. See note 80 infra (social scientists and practitioners testifying in Hart case).
So that lawyers and judges might be able to evaluate data with greater facility, legal
education should include training in basic concepts of analytical methods. See Lasswell &
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public In-
terest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 204-06 (1943) (calling for such training); Moynihan, supra note 6,
at 30 (discussing need for exposing attorneys to basic analytical concepts).
17. See A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS xvii-xviii
(1957) (Brandeis viewed briefs and arguments as starting point and drew heavily on
library sources).
18. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(2) (power of courts to appoint masters); Fiss, supra note
5, at 56 (noting that special master can serve not only as auxiliary spokesman in struc-
tural litigation, but also as intermediate structure standing between judge and organiza-
tion and between judge and body politic); Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule
53, 58 COLUM. L. Rv. 452 (1958) (examining masters); Note, "Mastering" Intervention in
Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979) (examining role of masters in prison litigation).
19. See FED. R. EviD. 706 (power of courts to appoint experts).
20. See Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief. From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694 (1963) (examining how courts use amicus briefs to secure information and foster
group participation in decisionmaking process).
21. See, e.g., Cottrell, The Interrelationships of Law and Social Science, in LAw AND
THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 108 (H. Jones ed. 1968) (discussing value of social science in
law); Nagel, Law and the Social Sciences: What Can Social Science Contribute? 51
A.B.A.J. 356 (1965) (same).
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limits of social science.22 They can maintain ongoing efforts to monitor
organizational behavior by issuing "structural" injunctions, 2 3 consisting
of a series of supplemental decrees. Finally, in the implementation
process, courts can employ special masters,24 lay committees, 25 and
other enforcement panels. 26 By using these varied techniques, the
judiciary can collect the information needed to design and execute
relief.2
7
, Although critics are correct in noting that agencies will often oppose
a court's attempts to change the institutions' policies,28 these observers
fail to recognize that in some circumstances bureaucrats may willingly
favor judicial intervention. The court's intervention might secure a
level of funding that the bureaucrats would not have obtained through
the normal political process. 29 Furthermore, in situations of internal
22. See Yudoff, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and
Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 62 LAw & ComxzaP. PROB. (No. 4) 57, 108
(1978) (social science has not been decisive in school desegregation cases because courts
recognize inability to provide unambiguous answers). On the limits to the objective uses
of social science generally in matters with political ramifications, see Frankel, The
Autonomy of the Social Sciences, in CONTROVERSIES AND DEcisIONS 9, 29 (C. Frankel ed.
1976); Wirth, Preface to K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA at xvii (1936).
23. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCriON 36-37 (1978) (uses of structural injunc-
tion in changing organizational behavior).
24. See, e.g., Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Austin, 511 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1975) (special master
used in implementing housing discrimination decree); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp.
549 (E.D. La. 1972) (special master used to oversee correctional reform).
25. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (N.D. Ga.) (per curiam), re-
manded, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973) (establishing Biracial Committee to oversee school
desegregation remedy); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 378 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (establish-
ing "human rights committees" to oversee mental health institutional reform).
26. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715,
717 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (expert professional advisory board used in restructuring facility for
retarded children). If dissatisfied with the implementation process, the court could resort
to receivership, in which a court-selected official would take the place of the defendant
officers for the purposes of administering the decree. See FED. R. Civ. P. 66 (federal courts
can appoint receivers); Comment, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization
of Neoreceiverships to Implement Large-Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REv.
1161 (studying receivers and other court-appointed officers).
27. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 428, 435-62 (1977) (examining uses of devices in institutional reform).
28. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (Ist Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1042 (1977) (resistance of school officials, administrators, and community to court decision
in desegregation case led to school being placed in receivership); Roberts, The Extent of
Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High School, 12 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 55 (1976) (discussing South Boston receivership).
29. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 293 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (school
board and plaintiffs, formerly antagonists, "joined forces apparently for the purpose of
extracting funds from the state treasury"); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a
Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1367-68 (1975) (head of
mental health system looked upon decree as method of obtaining increased financial
support from governor and state legislature).
It should be noted that court action might not yield the desired effect. The judiciary
cannot directly require the appropriation of funds. See Frug, supra note 9, at 770. Thus,
if a funding body chooses not to increase an agency's budget, then the bureaucracy would
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bureaucratic disagreement, some factions may welcome judicial in-
tercession in support of their position.'0 Moreover, while elected
executives and legislators might more closely monitor the preferences
of the public, judges sometimes may be better able to fashion a rational
plan because they are relatively free of the pressures of lobbyists,
bureaucracies, and interest groups.31
Courts, in sum, can create the apparatuses needed to make and
monitor decisions. But such a finding can hardly end an examination
of judicial capacity to remake the processes and policies of public
bureaucracies. The locus of discussion in much of the literature-
whether courts have the equipment to intervene effectively-is mis-
placed. Machinery designed to collect data is of minimal assistance in
interpreting information. Nor can it aid a judge in determining what
factors should be considered in choosing a remedy. In short, formal
machinery by itself does not ensure that the judiciary will fashion
workable relief, and therefore should not be of principal concern.
Rather, the focus should be on the delineation of criteria by which a
judge can create an appropriate remedy.
II. Guiding Judicial Intervention: The Uses of Organization Theory
The implementation of new policies and procedures often involves
changing the behavior of public bureaucracies; 32 a remedial plan will
be successful largely to the extent to which the court appreciates the
have to restructure its own priorities. In order to raise the money needed to implement
the court's decree, it might have to lower the level of funding of other programs. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 293-95 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (state board
resisted assuming city's portion of excess costs resulting from court-ordered remedial
plan); D. HoRowrrz, supra note 2, at 258-59 (court ordered government and school system
to provide education for emotionally disturbed children, but city refused to acknowledge
financial responsibility). In some situations, however, a court may be able to in effect
compel the funding unit to appropriate funds. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305,
1314-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (implying that if state did not comply with decree, court might
choose master to sell state lands for purpose of securing needed funds).
30. Cf. H. J1EcLo, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS IN 'WASHINGTON
154-90 (1977) (divergence in perspectives may exist between political executives, who
serve at pleasure of elected officials, and careerists, whose tenure is generally assured);
Neustadt, Politicians and Bureaucrats, in THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUrURE 118 (D.
Truman ed. 1973) (same).
31. See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307-08 (noting such advantages). But see Glazer,
supra note 2, at 70-71 (questioning Chayes's view).
32. "Bureaucracy" is defined as a large organization (a consciously coordinated system
of activities among two or more persons) in which the responsibility for achieving this
coordination is divided among several appointed officials. C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE EXECUTIVE 73 (1938); J. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS 217 n.2 (1978). Bureaucracy was
the subject of Max Weber's classic analysis. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC OROANIZATION 329-40 (T. Parsons ed. 1947).
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particular characteristics of the organization it is scrutinizing. A re-
medial approach that works in one context may fail in another. Hence,
the critical task for those interested in effective intervention is to alert
the judge to the complexities of restructuring bureaucracies. 33 Orga-
nization theory can provide courts with the necessary guidance to
understand how bureaucracies function and thus to reshape institu-
tions effectively.
A. An Organization Theory Framework
Organization theory establishes that in order to understand the
behavior of public bureaucracies, it is necessary to examine the in-
teraction of internal factors and external forces.3 4 The theory identifies
those internal and external factors that can affect the policies and even
the survival of the bureaucracy. By utilizing these concepts to ascertain
if means are available and usable to achieve the stated end, a judge can
determine whether a proposed remedy is likely to be effective. 35 More-
over, he can estimate the difficulties that would be incurred in im-
plementing each option, and can then design a remedy tailored to the
situation.3 1
1. Internal Organizational Factors
Organization theory examines five basic internal factors: mission,
goals, tasks, power structure, and autonomy.
33. Cf. H. KAUFMAN, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 5-92 (1971) (examining
why organizations difficult to change); Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, 6 PUB. INTEREST
6-9 (1967) (discussing problems bureaucracies face).
34. Organization theory from the political scientist's perspective focuses on empirical
inquiry, that is, on how organizations do behave, not on how they should behave, and
holds that to understand outcomes it is necessary to study a multiplicity of factors, internal
and external. For model studies of organizational behavior, see H. KAUFMAN, THE FOREST
RANGER (1960) (forest rangers in forest service); J. WILSON, suPra note 32 (managing FBI
and narcotics agents). The analysis presented here does not seek to present a compre-
hensive survey of organization theory in all its complexity, but endeavors to familiarize
the reader with basic concepts.
35. See H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 61 (3d ed. 1973) (administrative decision
correct if it selects appropriate means to reach designated ends).
36. Remedial design may involve major changes or innovations within an organiza-
tion. Innovation in Wilson's view proceeds in three stages: the conception of the change,
the proposing of the change, and the adoption and implementation of the change. See
Wilson, Innovation in Organization: Notes Towards A Theory, in APPROACHES TO ORGA-
NIZATIONAL DESIGN 195, 198 (J. Thompson ed. 1964). See generally G. DowNs, BUREAUCRACY,
INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976) (innovation of policies in bureaucracy). On the
implementation stage, see, e.g., E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977); E. HAR-
GROVE, THE MISSING LINK (1975) (discussing need for greater attention to problems of
implementation); J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAvSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973) (case study of
implementation of employment program).
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a. Mission. Typically, an organization seeks to instill a sense of
"mission" in its members. An organizational mission is not merely the
formal goal of the organization, but a "distinctive and valued set of
behaviors," 37 a shared feeling among organization personnel about the
nature, feasibility, and importance of the organization's tasks.38 In
order to develop this feeling of mission or distinctive competence,
bureaucracies must cultivate an organizational ethos, an attitude about
the value of the tasks and the work of the organization. 39 When a
strong sense of mission exists, the difficulties in securing the necessary
level of cooperative effort decrease; 40 upper-level administrators will
be able to secure cooperation from below and need not closely monitor
employees or dispense instructions to the degree necessary when a sense
of mission is lacking.
41
b. Goals. Goals are images of desirable future states of affairs.
42
Unlike mission, which relates to the overall ethos of the organization,
goals are the specific objectives toward which an agency's behavior is
directed. An organizational goal is "utopian" if it specifies a desired
state that is impossible to reach,43 and "operational" if it can be
achieved. 44 Specific or detailed goals, moreover, may be derived from
generally stated ones: the goal that is thus derived is termed a sub-goal. 43
In addition, individuals within the organization may have personal
goals relating to their aspirations in terms of income, power, position,
or prestige.
4 6
37. J. WILSON, supra note 32, at 14 (emphasis in original).
38. See P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION 17, 42-56 (1957) (developing con-
cept of mission); cf. M. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 26-40 (1974)
(examining mission of military organizations).
39. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 38, at 42-56.
40. See J. WILSON, supra note 32, at 13 (belief in bureaucracy's mission facilitates or-
ganizational loyalty).
41. Id.
42. This is a standard definition that usually begins a discussion of goals. See, e.g., F.
KAST & J. ROSENZWEIG, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 156 (1974); J. WILSON, POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS 46 (1973). The manner in which goals are defined and used has been a
subject of much discussion. See, e.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF
THE FIRM 26-43 (1963) (goals are set as result of bargaining among coalitions of various
participants); H. SIMON, supra note 35, at 262 (organizational goal defined in terms of
constraints or requirements that organization must meet); Perrow, The Analysis of Goals
in Complex Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. REv. 854 (1961) (distinguishing between official
organizational goals and those that actually characterize institution's behavior).
43. For example, absolute elimination of crime is a "utopian" goal.
44. That is, one can make an unambiguous judgment that the desired state of affairs
has come into being. J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 155 (1958).
45. See id. at 190-93; H. SIMON, supra note 35, at 62-66 (on relationship between means
and ends).
46. See A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 79-111 (1967) (examining milieu, motives, and
goals of various kinds of bureaucrats). Personal goals are not necessarily compatible with
organizational goals. See H. SIMON, supra note 35, at 65-66.
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c. Power Structure. Some actors in an organization typically exert
more influence on decisions than do others.47 On any particular issue,
the influence of a participant on organizational decisions and outcomes
is dependent on a number of factors: formal position in the hierarchy,
involvement in upper-level decisionmaking, access to information need-
ed to identify options, control over resources needed to implement
decisions, and personal capacity to persuade others. 48
d. Tasks. Tasks-the work of the organization-may be regarded as
being either programmed or nonroutine.49 Programmed tasks are per-
formed on a routine, predetermined basis.5 0 Because such tasks involve
little discretion, they can be controlled by providing a detailed set of
specifications or "program" describing how the tasks are to be per-
formed. 5' Nonroutine tasks, on the other hand, involve only a minimal
level of prescribed repetitive operations.52 Such tasks are often com-
plicated and vary with the changing environment. Employees perform-
ing such tasks are vested with considerable discretion. As the number
of nonroutine tasks increases, the organization's need to monitor the
behavior of those vested with discretion becomes greater. Thus, this
development is typically accompanied by the addition of supervisory
levels and the creation of specialized units.5 3
e. Autonomy Versus Coordination. Organizations generally seek an
independent sphere of action, or "autonomy."5 4 A bureaucracy's lead-
ership typically believes that the organization will perform best when
free from interference by others who have little knowledge or under-
standing of its activities. When a major policy area cuts across many
departments and agencies, the chief executive may seek to coordinate
the activities of those organizations in order to foster administrative
47. A growing literature has arisen about what Graham Allison has termed the
"bureaucratic politics" model. See G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS 162 (1971). The model views outcomes as the result of bargaining among
many actors who pull and haul with the power at their discretion for ends that will
further their conception of national, organizational, and personal interests. See, e.g., G.
ALLISON & P. SZANTON, REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY: THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONNECTION
(1976); M. HALPERIN, supra note 38; R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1976 ed.).
48. See G. ALLISON, supra note 47, at 168-69.
49. The "programmed" task notion was developed by March and Simon. See J. MARCH
& H. SIMON, supra note 44, at 142-44.
50. Id.
51. Wilson, supra note 36, at 198-99.
52. Id. at 198.
53. Id. at 199.
54. See, e.g., M. HALPERIN, supra note 38, at 51-54 (military organizations' desire for
freedom of movement); J. WILSON, sukra note 32, at 161, 164 (law enforcement officers'
concern for autonomy); cf. M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 196 (1964) (bureau-
cracies concerned with power and uncertainty).
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coherence and eliminate overlapping programs. 5 The desire for in-
stitutional autonomy, however, generally leads an organization to resist
efforts to coordinate its behavior with that of another organization.""
Coordination is particularly difficult when the organizations have
diverging conceptions of their missions and goals, or when they dis-
agree about the best way to achieve a goal.57
2. External Forces
Forces external to an organization can limit its freedom of action or
induce it to pursue certain programs.58 A legislature, for example, can
enact laws that shift the policy course of a public agency.
9 It can confer
or withdraw power, or change the agency's funding, thereby influenc-
ing the kinds of programs that the agency can undertake and the
intensity with which it can pursue them.
60 Furthermore, a public
bureaucracy often needs cooperation from nongovernmental actors
beyond its control if it is to succeed in its mission.
61
55. See H. SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 164 (1970). "Coordination" might
more properly be considered when examining external factors. However, because bureau-
cracy's desire for autonomy leads it to resist coordination, it is logical to examine the
coordination concept here, together with that of autonomy.
56. J. WILSON, supra note 32, at 165. For studies that discuss the problems of coordina-
tion, see N. CAIDEN & A. WILDAVSKY, PLANNING AND BUDGETING IN POOR COUNTRIES 277-79
(1974) (complexities of joint action); J. PRESSMAN, FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND CITY POLITICS
(1975) (dynamics of aid process in Oakland); H. SEIDMAN, supra note 55, at 164-94 (dif-
ficulties in coordinating federal agencies); J. SUNDQUIST, MAKING FEDERALISM WORK 13
(1969) (coordination problems in intergovernmental relations).
57. See J. PRESSMAN, supra note 56, at 10. Even when bureaucracies may initially reach
a policy agreement, that shared view may collapse during the implementation process.
See M. DERTHICK, NEW TOwNS IN-ToWN: WHY A FEDERAL PROGRAM FAILED (1972).
58. See M. BERNSTEIN, THE JOB OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 10-136 (1958) (how certain
external forces affect job of federal executive); J. WILSON, supra note 32, at 164.
59. See R. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE 216-314, 564-615 (1966) (impact of appro-
priations committees on agencies); M. KIRST, GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PASSING LAWS 64-118
(1969) (nonstatutory means of legislature to influence executive by controlling agency
budgets).
60. Even before a public bureaucracy submits its budget to the legislature, it may
have to secure approval of its funding request from a budget agency that is charged with
overseeing the programs of all government organizations to assure that they are in accord
with the chief executive's basic policies. The budget authority can also affect the
priorities of bureaucracies by passing judgment upon the way in which each agency
allocates resources among programs within its domain. See A. WILDAvsKY, THE POLITICS
OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 1-126 (2d ed. 1974) (effect of budget bureau on agency funding);
Heclo, OMB and the Presidency-the Problem of "Neutral Competence," 38 PUB. INTEREST
80 (1975) (impact of OMB on bureaucracies' programs).
61. For instance, the efficacy of a board of education's desegregation program may
depend on its ability to persuade parents not to withdraw their children from the public
school system. See G. ORFiELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION (1969)
(mechanics of school desegregation).
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B. Organization Theory and Court Intervention
Organization theory suggests that a decisionmaker, in fashioning a
remedial plan, should "backward map"-that is, focus on what must
be done in the final stages to resolve the problem as defined, deter-
mine whether the means are available to achieve the desired end, and
then ascertain whether he is free to use those means. 62 By studying
how a proposed plan affects the internal and external forces that or-
ganization theory identifies, the decisionmaker should be able to fore-
cast many of the difficulties in the implementation process. Moreover,
in designing and implementing relief, he should make use of feedback
mechanisms63-devices to secure information-so that he might assess
the effectiveness of his order, spot problems, and, if necessary, modify
his directives in the face of changing circumstances.
1. Internal Factors
a. Mission and Goals. In applying organization theory, a court will
recognize that change will be difficult in an organization that has
successfully instilled a sense of mission; those who believe in the
bureaucracy's mission are likely to resist judicial efforts to alter it. In-
deed, professionals, whose behavior and policy perspectives are con-
strained by norms derived from external reference groups that allocate
rewards such as advancement and esteem, are particularly likely to
resist attempts to reorient the organization in a way that conflicts with
their conception of what the bureaucracy should be doing. 4 More-
over, professionals and nonprofessionals alike may obstruct efforts to
change the organization's mission and goals if they perceive that their
personal goals will be threatened.
In addition, a court should realize that it will more likely achieve
its goals if it defines those ends unambiguously so that the relevant
actors will clearly understand what is required of them. 5 A judge
62. See R. NEUSTADT, supra note 47, at 41-42 (discussing backward mapping); Allison,
Implementation Analysis: The Missing Chapter in Conventional Analysis: A Teaching
Exercise, in BENEFIT-COST & POLICY ANALYSIS: 1974 at 369 (R. Zeckhauser ed.) (discussing
importance of such implementation analysis).
63. See H. KAUFMAN, ADMINImsTRATIvE FEEDBACK (1973) (studying administrative feedback
in nine federal bureaus); T. WHISLER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE (1970) (feedback control and application to management).
64. See P. BLAU & W. SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 60-74, 242-47 (1962) (discussing how
professionalism affects behavior of personnel); R. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY
36-57, 76-86 (1980) (examining how differing professional norms of lawyers and economists
influence behavior).
65. If the goal is stated too generally, then parties with clashing views could thwart the
implementation process. An example from urban policy serves as an apt illustration. In
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should make certain that the proposed remedy provides the technology
for attaining those goals.
b. Power Structure. In order to minimize the difficulties involved
in changing mission and goals, the judiciary must analyze the agency's
power structure.6 6 It should identify those actors who can influence
outcomes and determine which of those are likely to support judicial
intervention. In fashioning a decree, the court should seek to give a
leadership role to those elements that are most likely to comply with
the judge's order. In cases in which it is feasible and necessary, the
court should reorganize the existing structure so as to increase the
power of sympathetic forces in the decisionmaking process.
c. Tasks. The success of judicial intervention depends to some ex-
tent on the nature of the tasks it seeks to affect; organization theory can
help the court identify those tasks and problems. Routine tasks are
relatively easy to change because it is necessary only to alter the pro-
gram. Changing nonroutine tasks, however, complicates implementa-
tion of a plan: the court must establish monitoring devices to acquire
performance data and then must react to that information. Moreover,
changing tasks is even more difficult when the reward system is closely
intertwined with task performance,
7 that is, when employees accus-
tomed to being rewarded for performing certain tasks have those tasks
changed as a result of court action. Courts must induce organizational
actors to perform the tasks necessary for compliance with the court
order. Usually, judges will be most effective when the actors perceive
that compliance will not diminish their professional rewards.
68
d. Autonomy and Coordination. The court must be prepared to
meet resistance if it seeks to coordinate the behavior of bureaucracies
that are fearful of losing autonomy. These difficulties will increase if
the bureaucracies disagree about goals or the way in which goals should
urban housing policy, the generally stated goal may be the "revitalization 
of slum areas."
From this goal, no single operational sub-goal can be derived. It may 
be that the
revitalization of slum areas could be achieved by increasing the political power 
of urban
poor through expanded community action programs; alternatively, it may be 
that the
goal could be attained by bolstering local mayors (perhaps by making more federal 
funds
available to city halls). These operational goals conflict. Local mayors are likely 
to view
expanded community action programs as threats to their own power. Community-based
groups are likely to challenge city hall's authority. In the end, the conflict may 
actually
frustrate the realization of the general goal. Cf. Brown, The Scope and Limits of Equality
as a Normative Guide to Federal Health Policy, 26 PuB. PoL'Y 481, 488-96 (1976) 
(examin-
ing how problem definition affects policy conception and implementation).
66. See C. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending 
Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43 (1979) (role of judge as powerbroker).
67. See Wilson, supra note 36, at 200.
68. Cf. Clark & Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations, 6 AD. ScI. Q.
129-66 (1961) (problems of organizational maintenance and distribution of incentives).
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be achieved. In such circumstances, the court must invest its resources
in an attempt to forge cooperative activity among the relevant actors.
2. External Factors
Organization theory further instructs courts to appreciate that secur-
ing the responsiveness of actors external to the agency will be espe-
cially difficult when they themselves are not subject to the suit. Simply
stated, judges cannot directly compel such outside agents. 9 For in-
stance, the judiciary cannot order a legislature to appropriate funds,
nor may it prevent parents, dissatisfied with a school desegregation
order, from withdrawing their children from public school and en-
rolling them in private institutions.7 0 Thus external forces over which
a court may have little control can severely weaken a remedy. In situa-
tions in which the court must devise a remedy whose success depends
upon the cooperation of external actors, organization theory suggests
that courts engage those elements in the decisionmaking process and
convince them of the high costs of noncompliance.
III Restructuring Institutions: The Case of Hart v.
Community School Board
The value of organization theory as a guide for judicial intervention
can be demonstrated by examining Hart v. Community School Board,71
a case in which a federal district judge confronted the problem of fash-
ioning an effective decree that changed existing organizational ar-
rangements. Judge Jack Weinstein sought to restructure an educational
institution, Mark Twain Junior High School, for the purpose of
achieving racial integration. The case highlights the importance of
understanding the character of organizations in designing structural
remedies; had the court approached the remedial problem in the sys-
69. Cf. T. BECKER & M. FEELEY, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2d ed.
1973) (case studies showing in part dependence of courts on good faith of general public
and officials in securing compliance). Because private bureaucracies, unlike public
organizations, generally control factors of production, it may be easier for courts to
restructure them. See generally Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation:
A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353 (1979) (discussing restructuring
of corporations to inhibit institutional crime).
70. Cf. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 51-52 (1970) (parents can express un-
happiness through "exit," that is, by leaving public school system).
71. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afrd,
512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). The author wishes to express his appreciation to James Meyer-
son of the NAACP, who granted access to virtually all relevant documents. For a thorough
description of the case, see Fishman, The Limits of Remedial Power, in THE LIMITs OF
JUSTICE 115 (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds. 1978).
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tematic way that organization theory provides, it would more quickly
have become conscious of the limits and opportunities of the possible
options.
A. The Problems Confronting the Court in the Hart Case
Mark Twain Junior High School Number 239, located in Brooklyn's
Coney Island, had become racially segregated by 1973.
72 Despite com-
plaints about the problem from the parents of Mark Twain children
and some local educators,' 3 the community school board
74 refused to
make changes in the existing order.
7 5 The local school board was also
72. 383 F. Supp. at 711. The total enrollment had declined from 1933 students in
1962 to 713; the minority population had risen from about 19% in 1962 to 81%. Id. Of the
minority population, in 1973, blacks accounted for about 43.3% of the student body and
Hispanics for about 38.6%. Id. In the community school district where Mark Twain was
located, however, the minority population in 1973 was 17% of the total resident enroll-
ment at the intermediate and junior high school levels. Id. at 712.
The problems of Mark Twain-racial segregation and underutilization-were attributable
to a number of factors, but many resulted from the government's approach to housing and
urban revitalization problems. See id. at 721-23. By 1974, the percentage of white children
in New York City Housing Authority projects was approximately 18% and only 19.5%
in state-supported Urban Development Corporation projects. Report of the Special
Master: Part II-Physical and Human Renewal, at 2-11 [hereinafter cited as Special Master
Report II] (on file with Yale Law Journal). The racial composition of area schools-
Mark Twain Junior High School being one of the local educational institutions-mirrored
that found in the housing projects.
Moreover, in large measure, the problems of Mark Twain could be traced to the actions
and inaction of the local school board (Community School Board Number 21) and the
reluctance of the Central Board of Education officials to intervene to rectify conditions.
In various ways, the local board sharply reduced the white population of Mark Twain.
See 383 F. Supp. at 715-19. For example, it changed the zoning patterns of two ele-
mentary schools with predominately white student populations such that pupils who
formerly would have attended Mark Twain upon graduating from the sixth grade class
were sent to other junior high schools. Id. The school board reduced the student enroll-
ment at Mark Twain still further when it converted a recently constructed elementary
facility into an intermediate school (with grades 'seven and eight) and then proceeded to
populate it with predominantly white middle-income students whose neighborhoods were
previously part of the Mark Twain zone. Id.
73. See 383 F. Supp. at 717; Trial Testimony of Doris Chitaro, reprinted in Appendix
to Appellant's Brief, Docket No. 73-2990 at 23-26 [hereinafter cited as Appendix I].
74. Under the terms of a 1969 act to decentralize the New York City school system,
the school districts are guided by elected community school boards (the "local boards").
Senior high schools are still under the direct supervision of the central board of educa-
tion (the "Central Board"), which is headed by a chancellor. The local boards make
policy for the elementary and junior high schools. However, the Central Board reviews
local board decisions with respect to zoning and integration matters; if the local board's
decision runs counter to the policies of the Central Board, then the Central Board can
order the local board to modify its decision. See Trial Testimony of Irving Anker, re-
printed in Appendix I, supra note 73, at 1110-18.
75. The board decided upon this course after conducting a hearing at which parents
vehemently opposed rezoning plans, arguing that Mark Twain was an educationally in-
ferior institution, and that their children's safety would be endangered if they were sent
to Mark Twain. 383 F. Supp. at 717.
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unresponsive to the order of the Chancellor of the New York City
Board of Education70 to redress the racial imbalance; when the
Chancellor did nothing to secure compliance, 77 several white residents
began a lawsuit7 s
Following lengthy trial proceedings,70 including expert testimony,8 0
on-site inspections,"' and considerable off-the-bench research,S2 the
court, in its liability decision of January 28, 1974, held both the local
school board and the Chancellor in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. 3 The court's order affected a wide range of
76. He issued his directives only after an appeal had been lodged with the state com-
missioner of education. Id. at 717.
77. In response to then Chancellor Harvey Scribner's first directive in September 1971,the local board adopted a free-choice plan, but not a single white student enrolled at
Mark Twain pursuant to the plan despite improvements made in the school's facilitiesand programs. Id. at 718. Scribner rejected the plan in April 1972 and directed that the
board adopt a plan that would assure that by September 1974 the percentage of minority
students would not vary from the districtwide average by more than 10%. The local board
refused to comply; on July 5, 1972, Scribner issued a new and milder directive. Thelocal board rejected that as well and Scribner did nothing to enforce it. Id. at 717-20;
see Trial Testimony of Irving Anker, reprinted in Appendix I, supra note 73, at 1121-26;
Trial Testimony of Allen Zelon, reprinted in Appendix to Appellants Brief, Docket No.
74-2076, at 674-89 [hereinafter cited as Appendix II].
78. The NAACP-sponsored suit, a class action on behalf of the children attendingMark Twain, was filed on August 4, 1972, and alleged that the local board and thechancellor were maintaining the school as an unconstitutionally racially segregated and
underutilized school. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, reprinted in Appendix I, supra note 73,
at 2769-89.
79. Trial proceedings began on January 2, 1973 and final oral argument on the lia-bility questions was completed on December 19, 1973. Plaintiffs sought to show thatsegregation at Mark Twain was due to the actions and inaction of school officials. See
383 F. Supp. at 715-21. While virtually conceding that the school was segregated, the de-fendants responded that they had never intended to bring about the racial imbalance at
Mark Twain. See Answer of Defendant Community School Board and Officials thereof,reprinted in Appendix I, supra note 73, at 2793-96; Answer of Defendant Chancellor,
reprinted in id., at 2782-93. School officials maintained that their fear of escalating white
flight militated against the use of more stringent measures to integrate the school. See
Testimony of Irving Anker, reprinted in id. at 1139-40, 1142. In the alternative, the local
board claimed that if segregation existed, it resulted from housing policies, promulgated
by other governmental agencies. See Answer of Defendant Community School Board and
Officials thereof, supra, at 2793.
80. See Testimony of Nathan Glazer, reprinted in Appendix I, supra note 73, at 2177-
237 (expert testimony called by defendant school board); Testimony of Dan Dodson,
reprinted in id. at 456-839 (testimony by plaintiffs' expert).
81. The judge toured the school and the Coney Island area. 383 F. Supp. at 710;Remarks of Judge Weinstein, reprinted in Appendix I, supra note 73, at 1712.
82. See 383 F. Supp. at 743-47 (citing wide range of social science sources). The judge's
willingness to engage in off-the-bench research was indicated by his response to Attorney
James Meyerson's request to read an article from the HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEw: "I
will read it, I have a lot of other things in the case and I might as well read that, too."
Remarks of Judge Weinstein, reprinted in Appendix II, supra note 77, at 916.
83. 383 F. Supp. at 707, 716, 721. The Court declared:
[A]s in the case of so many tragedies of our times, the many people of good will and
fine intentions were overwhelmed by social tides beyond their individual control.
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parties. In an effort to achieve a comprehensive solution,84 the judge
directed virtually all agencies that had even the slightest relation to
education policy-schools,35 housing,86 transit,87 park,88 and police
authorities89-to submit plans on March 1, 1974 that would be opera-
tive in September 1974.90 In particular, Judge Weinstein seemed com-
mitted to the view that a major restructuring of housing and other
urban policies in the Coney Island area was essential to achieve the
desegregation objectives; it was thus clear that the responses of the
housing agencies would be of central importance.
Plaintiffs submitted six possible plans,9' but stated a preference for
a busing plan that would create virtually equal percentages of minority
enrollment in every junior high and intermediate school in the dis-
trict.92 The Chancellor's proposals also entailed busing.93 The local
school board, however, proposed that Mark Twain become a magnet
school-a facility for specially gifted children drawn from the entire
And the bureaucracies, instead of imaginatively drawing together all agencies of the
government, separately applied the logic of consistency to deaden the spirit of re-
sistance, making segregation inevitable instead of only highly probable.
Id. at 707.
84. Id. at 753-54. The defendant school board impleaded those agencies that it held
responsible for the segregation-the mayor, the City of New York, federal, state, and
municipal housing authorities and officials. See Answer of Defendant Community School
Board and Officials thereof, reprinted in Appendix I, supra note 73, at 2794. The com-
munity school board requested that the court order desegregation of public housing and
direct that the federal and state housing authorities be forbidden to authorize new loans
and grants to New York City until they had eliminated policies that resulted in segrega-
tion. Id. at 2795-96.
85. Education authorities were to develop a plan so that Mark Twain's minority
student population would not deviate by more than 10% from the districtwide average of
nonwhite pupils in junior high and intermediate schools. 383 F. Supp. at 756.
86. Id. at 757. Housing authorities of the city, state, and federal governments were
ordered to submit a joint plan that would "undo the racial imbalance in publicly-sup-
ported housing in Coney Island." Id.
87. The Metropolitan Transit Authority was ordered to rearrange bus schedules to
provide service to Mark Twain. Id.
88. The Park Department was to join in planning as "Mark Twain makes heavy use
of Park Department facilities." Id. at 758.
89. The police commissioner was to "present a plan for adequate protection of
children in the vicinity of the school." Id.
90. Id. at 756. The court expected these many agencies to work together, declaring:
"I am not going to permit one agency to pass the buck to another and say that we
cannot do it." Transcript of Judge Weinstein's remarks, reprinted in Appendix II, supra
note 77, at 1363.
91. Memorandum from Dan W. Dodson to NAACP Special Contribution Fund (Feb.
22, 1974) (on file with Yale Law journal).
92. 383 F. Supp. at 771.
93. Report of the Chancellor Pursuant to the Opinion of the Court in Hart v.
Community School District 21, March 1, 1974, at 9 (on file with Yale Law Journal). In
this report, the Chancellor sharply criticized the court's order, charged it was "counter-
productive," id. at 8, and argued that a shift in housing policy was the key to integra-
tion, id. at 10.
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district.9 4 Implementation of this proposal would not require busing,
an option opposed by most of the elected, and hence, politically sensi-
tive, school board members.95 The plans of the Police Department, New
York City Parks, Recreation and Cultural Affairs Department, and
Transit Authority varied in degrees of responsiveness.96 In general,
officials of the city, state, and federal agencies indicated in various
ways that their organizations could do little in the near future to
change housing conditions in Coney Island.97
Realizing how difficult it would be to develop a plan involving all
of the affected agencies, 98 the court concluded that it had to create some
means to coordinate the activities of the many bureaucracies and to
devise and then implement a remedial program.99 For those purposes,
the court appointed a special master'00 who was to consult informally
with the parties and outside experts, develop a comprehensive plan,
and, if possible, gain the parties' consent to his blueprint.' 0 ' After
94. 383 F. Supp. at 759-60. Students would be drawn only from the district, and would
be specifically admitted to accelerated and enriched programs on the basis of standardized
examinations. Mark Twain would adhere to the approximate ratio of 70% white, 30%
minority. The school would gradually phase in its operation. Parents would have the
right to withdraw their children from Mark Twain and have them returned to their
zoned school immediately and for any reason. See 383 F. Supp. at 711; Testimony of Allen
Zelon, March 6, 1974, at 332-416 (on file with Yale Law Journal). Throughout the balance
of the case, the school board supported the magnet school concept as being the most
palatable and workable solution.
95. See Report of the Special Master: Part I-the School Plan, at 4, 54 (on file with
Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Special Master's Report I]; Interview with James
Meyerson, NAACP attorney, June 10, 1978 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
96. The Police Department provided a "plan to protect children coming and going to
school and against intruders." 383 F. Supp. at 759. The Parks, Recreation and Cultural
Affairs Administration announced that it would rehabilitate bathroom facilities in the
park next to the school. Id. The court deemed this measure insufficient in view of the
park's unsafe and deteriorating conditions. Id. The Transit Authority provided what the
court termed "helpful" data about transportation routes. Id.
97. See, e.g., id. at 760 (New York City Housing and Urban Development Administra-
tion submitted variety of proposals; none "prepared specifically to meet the issues raised
in [the] lawsuit"); Testimony of S.V. Green, reprinted in Appendix II, supra note 77, at
1509-10 (Regional Administrator of Department of Housing and Urban Development
stated his agency was frustrated by Office of Management and Budget's "reserving" of
hundreds of millions of dollars); N.Y. Times, March 2, 1974, § 1, at 34, cols. 1-2 (Lee
Goodwin, Commissioner of New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal
characterized agency as "constricted by crippling inflation"); Letter of Edward Logue,
President of State Urban Development Corporation, to Judge Weinstein (March 1, 1974)
("After meetings among the representatives [of the many agencies at the state, local and
federal levels] no agreement has been reached.") (copy on file with Yale Law Journal).
98. As the varied responses clearly showed, the agencies operated on different levels of
government and under different laws, regulations, and methods of financing. Accordingly,
Judge Weinstein extended the effective date of the plan one year past the date initially
set. 383 F. Supp. at 762.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The master's plan was to be wide-ranging, "dealing not only with the elimina-
tion of segregation at the Mark Twain Junior High School but also with the housing,
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months of study, the special master recommended that the court adopt
a modified version of the local board's magnet school proposal.
10 2
Moreover, because the special master believed, as apparently did the
judge, that the key to long-term racial integration would be effective
housing and physical renewal in Coney Island, 03 he proposed a hous-
ing plan designed to attract middle-income families to central Coney
Island via lower rents, higher maximum income-eligibility require-
ments for public housing, and increased housing subsidies. 04
The court held hearings on the special master's report that covered
both the education and housing plans. The school board supported
the special master's report,0 5 but the plaintiffs opposed the magnet
remedy, contending that it would be inappropriate. 10 6 Housing offi-
nonresidential development, community, social welfare, recreational, transportation and
protective facilities within the Coney Island neighborhood necessary to provide a basis for
effectively desegregating Mark Twain .. . ." Id. at 768. Curtis Berger, a Columbia Law
School professor and an expert on the law of property, was appointed special master. Id.
at 767. Berger spent three months gathering information about the housing and educa-
tion problems in Coney Island. See Letter of Transmittal with Special Master's Report,
Part II, at v (July 8, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal). For a personal view of the
special master's tasks, see Berger, Away From the Court House and Into the Field: The
Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 707 (1978).
102. Unlike the Board, he suggested that the school admit students who showed
talent in typing, shorthand, music, athletics, art, wood and metal crafts. The Special
Master urged that measures be taken to assure that the school be free of the segregative
effects of tracking, lest the purpose of the enterprise be defeated. Special Master's Report I,
supra note 95, at 4, 6, 17-19; Testimony of Curtis Berger, July 11, 1974, at 301, 304, 306
(on file with Yale Law Journal). With the support of the school board, the special master
believed that this plan had the best chance of succeeding. Special Master's Report I,
supra note 95, at 9. The alternative of busing could lead to white flight, Berger argued,
thereby exacerbating the problems of racial imbalance. Id. at 54. Berger strategically
combined his endorsement of the magnet school concept with a recommendation calling
for implementation of the plaintiffs' busing proposal if his own plan failed. Id. at 43, 47-
48. To make the magnet Mark Twain as attractive as possible, he further suggested that
all schools but Mark Twain phase out special and enrichment programs. Testimony of
Curtis Berger, reprinted in Appendix II, supra note 77, at 2275.
103. See Special Master Report II, supra note 72, at ii, I. Upon surveying existing hous-
ing policies, the special master concluded that "if the current trend continues, significant
integration cannot occur." Id. at 23.
104. Id. at iii, 22-39. He urged adoption of a relocation plan that sensitively met the
needs of site residents. Id. at iii. His report called for the replacement of existing sub-
standard housing, home ownership, vigorous building code enforcement, and the construc-
tion of shopping centers and commercial areas. See id.
105. Representatives of the local board, once skeptical about the court's efforts, were
pleased that the special master had accepted the magnet school concept. See Testimony
of Evelyn Acquila, local board member, reprinted in Appendix II, supra note 77, at
2288-316.
106. Critics of the education plan objected at the hearings that it would make Mark
Twain a "special elitist school," Clark, Reactions to the Report of the Special Master
(Curtis J. Berger), Part I: The School Plan, reprinted in Appendix II, supra note 77, at
306c, that it was a "blatantly racist solution to the problem," Memorandum from Dan
Dodson to NAACP Special Contribution Fund Regarding Report to the Special Master
(July 8, 1974), reprinted in id., at 470, in that minority youths would have to leave the
community so that "favored whites," id. at 477, could "voluntarily transfer" to Mark
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cials107 and local residents 08 vigorously criticized the housing blue-
print. Ultimately, in its remedial order of July 26, 1974, the court
adopted the local board's plan for a magnet facility, together with the
Twain, id. In response, Berger sought to show that the magnet plan when fully operative
placed only a marginally greater burden on blacks, and that even under the Dodson
plan (Model II), a substantial number of nonwhites in Coney Island would have to
attend schools other than Mark Twain. In addition, he contended that his plan was more
likely to achieve lasting integration than Dodson's Model II, which he believed would
lead to white flight. Testimony of Curtis Berger, reprinted in id. at 2233-40, 2274-75.
107. City and state housing officials argued that Part II of the special master's report,
the human and physical renewal study, was fraught with administrative nightmares that
made it impractical. See Starr & Zucotti, Response of Third-Party Defendant City of
New York to Part II of the Report of the Special Master (July 23, 1974), reprinted in
Appendix II, supra note 77, at 535-46. Relocation of 1,000 families in less than a year, they
claimed, was virtually impossible. Id. at 544. Moreover, because the plan would primarily
benefit people not living in Coney Island, it posed important questions of equity and ran
counter to the city's policy with regard to site residents. Id. at 537; see Testimony of
Roger Starr, Administrator of Housing and Development Administration, reprinted in id.,
at 2452, 2491-92.
The costs to the city, New York City officials argued, could be limitless, and the state
and federal governments should shoulder more responsibility. See Starr & Zucotti, supra,
at 537, 542; Testimony of Roger Starr, supra, at 2451-52. But the state objected that the
special master's recommendations would be an "open-ended draft on the treasury of the
State of New York." Objections to the Report of the Special Master Part II, "Physical
and Human Renewal" (Third-Party State Defendants), reprinted in Appendix II, supra
note 77, at 479f.
For their part, federal authorities stated that they did not have the necessary funds and
that in any case they were opposed to that part of the Berger plan that would have
involved raising the maximum limits on the incomes of persons who could enjoy sub-
sidies. See Testimony of S. William Green, regional administrator of HUD, reprinted in
id., at 2323-25. Some housing officials, moreover, were skeptical about the special master's
assumption that the "housing bargain" would induce white families to settle in Coney
Island and to send their children to public schools if they did make the move. See
Testimony of Roger Starr, supra, at 2460.
108. Undoubtedly, the most severe criticism of the Berger housing and renewal report
came from a group of intervenors consisting of approximately 1,000 low-income black
and Puerto Rican families who resided in the public housing projects in Coney Island.
These families charged that a court order to repopulate the housing projects with white
families might result in their displacement. These persons believed that none of the
parties were representing their interests. The NAACP was concerned essentially with
educational issues and therefore might not oppose an integrated housing approach that
led to their uprooting. See Remarks of Nancy LeBlanc, lawyer for the intervenors,
reprinted in Appendix II, supra note 77, at 1902. Judge Weinstein permitted those
residents with children in the school system-that is, those who would be affected by
both housing and school orders-to intervene. Others, affected only by the housing
report, could file an amicus brief. Decision of Judge Weinstein at Hearing of June 14,
1974, reprinted in id. at 1946-47.
The intervenors claimed that the Berger report was "inherently racist" and criticized
the special master for "accepting" the proposition that the people of Coney Island "are
part of the problem that has led to the segregation of Mark Twain." Objections to the
Report of the Special Master, Part I and II of the Intervenors, reprinted in id. at 480, 483.
It is interesting to note, moreover, that the intervenors argued that "since the special
master's proposal is so all encompassing ... it would better be left to the normal political
process for discussion, decision and implementation." Id. at 492. Thus, in this instance the
poor embraced a rather conservative view of judicial power. Cf. Bickel, supra note 5, at
175 (complex problems best left to society to resolve out of its tradition).
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special master's suggestion that the new school be phased in gradually. 09
The plaintiffs' busing proposal was held in reserve to be implemented
if the magnet school failed.110 Although the court had spoken earlier
of the need to coordinate the activities of housing, educational, and
other agencies,"' the final order almost completely ignored the housing
recommendations, except to request monthly progress reports from the
parties about their urban revitalization efforts in Coney Island."12
Less than a month after the decree, the local board began to imple-
ment the magnet school plan with such diligence that the court and
special master rarely intervened further." 3 The local board undertook
an intensive and wide-ranging public relations campaign to influence
the attitudes of parents involved in the Mark Twain experiment." 4
The magnet school opened in September 1975 and has met the court's
required 70-30 majority-to-minority enrollment ratio. 1 5 Applications
in the years following the school's opening have exceeded the number
of seats."16
109. 383 F. Supp. at 774.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 762.
112. Id. at 775. The court concluded that the "decretal tool is poorly designed for
restructuring an entire community." Id. Within 14 months, the court relieved all parties
of the obligation to file further reports, unless otherwise required. Weinstein, J., Memo
and Order, Discontinuing Monthly Reports (Sept. 8, 1975) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
113. While in general agreement with the court's decision, the local board appealed
the part that called for the utilization of the Dodson Plan as a stand-by, the section that
mooted the third-party complaint, and the portion that held it liable for the segregation
at Mark Twain. The plaintiffs appealed, and objected to the choice of the magnet
school and to the change in the desegregation timetable from September 1974 to September
1975. The Second Circuit unanimously upheld the lower court's finding of de jure
segregation and the proposed remedy. Hart v. Community School Board, 512 F.2d 37, 51,
54-55 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. See Letter of Allen H. Zelon, President of Community School Board 21 and
Bartelo Peluso, Community Superintendent, to Parents (Jan. 23, 1975) (cover letter of
brochure designed to attract applicants) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
115. See Junior High School Ethnic Distribution by Grade (May 22, 1978) (on file
with Yale Law Journal). Concern that the school might become internally tracked accord-
ing to race has, at least thus far, been unwarranted. See Letter and enclosure from Hyman
Bravin, counsel to Community School Board 21, to James Meyerson, NAACP attorney
(May 23, 1978) (data showing distribution of races within classes) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
116. Oelsner, New York's Best Public Schools Defy Racial Stereotyping, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 23, 1978, § B, at 1, col. 3. Commenting on the Mark Twain experiment, James
Meyerson, the NAACP attorney in the case, reportedly stated that the school is "a
magnificent example of what desegregation can do." Id. at 17, col. 2.
The accomplishment of the Mark Twain experiment should not be minimized; yet it
should also be noted that the special master's hope that Coney Island be revitalized is
largely unrealized. The area is still a racially isolated urban slum.
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B. Organization Theory Applied to Hart
In the end, Judge Weinstein, a most astute jurist, achieved his ob-
jective of desegregating Mark Twain. But he did so only after a lengthy
process, at first supporting and later retreating from the comprehensive
housing approach. Had the court employed organization theory, it
might have become aware more quickly of the difficulties of imple-
menting the comprehensive approach endorsed in the liability decision
and perhaps would have concentrated sooner on the magnet school
concept. By examining the remedial options-housing and educa-
tional-through the lens of organization theory, the utility of the frame-
work described above 17 in raising a judge's consciousness and in
prescribing a systematic approach to relief can be demonstrated.
1. The Housing Option
In assessing the appropriate housing strategy with the guidance of
organization theory, the court would have to consider the missions and
goals of the various housing authorities. It would realize that to alter
existing policy, it must effect changes in the missions of those bureau-
cracies. The city agency's primary mission is to provide dwellings for
the poor.1 18 If the court were to adopt a solution like that of the special
master, the agency would be required to redirect its efforts toward
middle-income family housing-a policy clearly contrary to the or-
ganization's mission. Organization theory suggests that the court
would almost certainly encounter resistance from housing officials.
Moreover, in relating the goals of the contemplated housing policy
to the bureaucracies charged with administering housing programs,
the court would quickly confront a major obstacle: overcoming sharp
differences among the housing authorities over the way to achieve the
goal of integrated housing. Finally, an assessment of the financial means
needed to achieve the goals, as called for by organization theory, could
only raise doubts in the judge's mind about the enterprise: the
resource requirements would be massive and some attempt would
have to be made to determine whether funds were available.
Organization theory would also lead the judge to identify the players
in the housing game, and to assess their positions and power bases.
The court could not fail to take note of the negative reaction of key
housing officials at city, state, and federal levels to the comprehensive
approach. Without the support of at least some bureaucratic elements-
117. See pp. 519-25 suPra.
118. See Starr & Zucotti, supra note 107, at 535-46 (discussing role of housing agency).
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and apparently there was none-the judge would no doubt face sub-
stantial problems.
In addition, a court applying organization theory could not but be
impressed with the enormousness of the task of restructuring housing
policy. The court would realize it would have to approve and monitor
the building and location of residential and commercial development,
supervise construction of new dwellings, specify the kinds of housing
units, and review the tenant selection process. Given the complexity
and nonroutine nature of such tasks, as well as the scope of the enter-
prise, the court would have to expend years of effort both planning
and monitoring performance to ensure compliance. 119
The theory would also immediately reveal that changing housing
policies would involve the court in a massive coordinating effort. Be-
fore the housing plans could be implemented, three levels of govern-
ment-federal, state, and local-would have to reach some agreement as
to policy, procedures, and funding. The court would have to resolve
disputes among these officials that surfaced during hearings on the
special master's report. Furthermore, it would have to coordinate not
only the activities of three levels of government but also the behavior
of various bureaucracies within each level. At the city level alone, for
example, the Housing and Development Administration, the City
Planning Commission, the Department of Real Estate, and the Cor-
poration Counsel would have to reach some consensus regarding hous-
ing policy. But each bureaucracy-as organization theory teaches-
tends to be jealous of its autonomy and would therefore be likely to
resist any arrangement that could infringe upon its ability to set its
own course. Besides overseeing the activities of government, the court
would have to coordinate the behavior of contractors, planners, and
foundations.
Remaking housing policy on the scale envisioned by the judge in his
liability decision and subsequently by the special master also would
have involved external factors crucial to effective implementation but
over which the court had little control. The court's efforts probably
could not succeed without the cooperation of the legislatures that
control appropriations and set policy. Yet, there could be no guarantee
that the many political bodies at the federal, state, and local levels
could or would be responsive to the court's plan.
Consideration of external forces would also lead the court to assess
119. Curtis Berger, who championed the housing plan, later recognized that it would
have been infeasible for the court to have been involved in an enterprise requiring so
much supervision. See Berger, supra note 101, at 735.
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the views of the local residents who might be uprooted if the compre-
hensive housing approach were accepted. A court would realize that
it would probably not achieve its ends over the vehement objections
of public housing residents-opposition that actually was heard at the
hearings. 120 Certainly, local political officials would be unlikely to
endorse and lobby for the housing efforts if their constituents rejected
the scheme. Thus, the factors applied by organization theory to explain
bureaucratic behavior would lead a court to reject implementation of
a housing plan. The court in Hart did, finally, reach the result that
organization theory suggests. However, it did so only after long months
of study. An initial evaluation of the plan using the theory would
probably have saved the court and the parties time and effort.
2. The Educational Options
Just as organization theory would sensitize a judge to the mammoth
difficulties of a housing remedy from the very beginning of his search
for workable relief, so the framework would educate him about the
practical results attainable if the remedial problem were defined in
terms of desegregating one school. To be sure, converting Mark Twain
into a magnet facility would involve considerable work on the part of
school authorities. Looking ahead, however, the judge would recognize
that implementation of the plan would be facilitated because the court
would not have to change the educational bureaucracy's mission of
teaching teenage children.
A judge applying organization theory would conclude that the
magnet school strategy was promising because it would enable the
court to posit the goal of integration unambiguously, and in a way
that would permit measurement of progress toward that goal's realiza-
tion: integration would be achieved when Mark Twain met the
majority-minority ratio that existed in other district schools. Thus, a
court could assess progress toward implementation without difficulty.
If the school did not meet the specified ratio within the time set by
the court, then the plan would not achieve the integration goal and
the court could impose an alternative strategy.
In addition, organization theory would prompt the court to become
familiar with the power structure of the local school board. On review-
ing the testimony of various school board members in hearings at the
liability stage, the judge would determine that there were members
sympathetic to his integration goals, the bloc supporting a magnet
120. See p. 531 & note 108 supra.
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school plan.121 By applying the concept, the court could effectively
bolster those forces, secure their cooperation in the implementation
process, and thereby increase the likelihood of success.
The theory next would lead the court to identify the kind of tasks
its remedy would impose on the bureaucracy affected. The tasks re-
quired to carry out the integration plan in Hart-designing new educa-
tional programs for Mark Twain, phasing out special programs in other
schools, and publicizing the new magnet facility-were relatively
familiar ones for the educators involved. Indeed, many of these tasks
could be regarded as routine. School personnel would not have to
design new curriculums for Mark Twain, but rather simply transfer
existing special programs from other district schools. Tasks like
scheduling classes would be routinely performed at Mark Twain
regardless of whether the educational program was standard or ac-
celerated. Thus, once the magnet school plan was accepted, the court
would not find it necessary to supervise closely the performance of
tasks. Moreover, by confining itself to the educational plan, the court
would have to deal with only one bureaucracy, and thus would avoid
the difficulties of coordinating disparate bureaucracies, each protective
of its autonomy.
Finding adoption of the plan supported by internal factors, the court
would then consider the impact of its proposal on external forces. The
magnet plan would be an attractive option because its implementation
would not depend on the funding actions of legislative bodies beyond
the court's authority. The magnet plan would be relatively inex-
pensive to implement, and maintenance of the magnet facility would
not require much more funding than a standard school. In addition,
the magnet school plan, compared to other alternatives, would seem
more likely to secure community acceptance. 122 Thus, analysis of the
magnet school plan in terms of organization theory's framework of
internal and external factors would make the judge cognizant of the
best approach for attaining the desegregation objectives as well as
enable him to identify problems that could arise in implementing the
option.
121. See Testimony of Allen Zelon, supra note 77, at 674-89 (explaining politics of
school board); Testimony of Allen Zelon, suPra note 94, at 332-416 (school board member
supporting goals of integration).
122. The liability hearings revealed, as did the special master's report, that parents
might withdraw their children from public schools if the plaintiffs' busing proposals
were adopted. The court would have no means of preventing parents from sending their
children to nonpublic schools-an option, which if exercised, could defeat the goal of
integration.
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Conclusion
Organization theory indicates-as its application to the education and
housing options in the Hart case demonstrates-that a court's efforts to
devise a workable remedy will be facilitated if it takes into account the
internal and external factors affecting bureaucratic behavior. To be
sure, there may be those who believe that in framing orders the
judiciary should not be concerned with whether the remedy is likely
to achieve the intended result. The objective of judicial intervention,
according to this view, is not practical effectiveness at all, but the
preservation of important values, as symbolized by a court's stated
commitment to rectify injustice. However, for a judge who thinks that
the mere articulation of rights is not sufficient, that rights cannot be
exercised meaningfully if the relief is unworkable, organization theory
can offer a disciplined framework that can aid in designing remedies.
As is the case with many public policy decisions, judicial orders can
assume an independent dynamic and momentum that is difficult, if
not virtually impossible, to reverse. One can imagine situations in which
the initial actions or inactions made in error by a judge proceeding on
an ad hoc basis could foreclose the subsequent imposition of other more
feasible remedies. With the guidance of organization theory, a judge
need not depend on the parties1 23 or on his intuitive sense; aided by
the framework, he can better make an independent evaluation of how
to define and solve the remedial problem.
In restructuring the policies and processes of public bureaucracies,
courts should do so with a sensitive appreciation of how organizations
function. 24 Only if they act with such an understanding can courts
realize their objectives. And, only then can wrongs be effectively re-
dressed and the future exercise of rights preserved.
123. A judge should not reflexively rely on the litigants' perception of the problem
for their definition may fail to lead to a result that rectifies the injuries. Indeed, had
Judge Weinstein accepted the school board's initial housing strategy, see note 84 supra,
and the plaintiffs' approaches, see p. 528 supra, the court might not have realized the
goal of desegregation.
124. In his essay, Professor Fiss writes that "no judge is likely to decree more than he
thinks he has the power to accomplish," Fiss, supra note 5, at 54, and notes that the
desire to be efficacious might lead courts to tailor the rights in question to fit the
remedy, thereby distorting those rights. Id. at 53-55. Where the parties' approach seems
unlikely to yield practical results, the court might be tempted to retreat; organization
theory is useful because it can make the judge aware of the gamut of possibilities and
lead him to act creatively to assure that rights are realized. Moreover, the organization
framework can reduce the likelihood that a judge will prescribe an administratively
unfeasible decree that will not redress the injuries the aggrieved parties have suffered.
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